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Abstract
Boyreau-Debray  analyzes  the relationship  between  indicators of local  banking development into the
growth and financial  intermediation  at the subnational  traditional growth  regression framework  using the
level within China.  Does the quality  of the banking  GMM-system  estimator. The results suggest that credit
sector  in a province affect  its rate of growth? Do state  extended  by the banking sector at the state  level has a
and nonstate banking sectors perform  differently?  Does  negative  impact on provincial  economic growth. This
the structure  of the local banking sector affect the rate  of  negative effect appears  to be attributable  to the
provincial  economic growth?  To answer these questions,  burden  of supporting the state-owned corporate  sector
the author first uses  evidence on the fragmentation  of  rather than to the poor performance  of state-owned
regional  capital markets to justify the existence of local  banks. Moreover,  provinces with more diversified
credit channels.  Second,  using a dataset of 26 provinces  banking sectors appear  to grow faster.
between  1990 and  1999, she  defines and  introduces
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China has maintained  a high rate of economic growth since the early 1980s-
averaging 9.5 percent per year-while  also implementing  reforms aimed at transitioning
from a  planned economy to a market economy. During this time, the non-state sector has
steadily expanded.  In 2000, non-state enterprises accounted for more than 80 percent of
production. The financial deepening  of the Chinese economy has also been impressive.
The total liquidity of the banking sector has increased  from 30 percent of GDP in 1979 to
148 percent of GDP in 1999, one of the highest ratios  in the world. After two decades of
reform, however,  the transition to a modem and profit-oriented  banking sector is far from
being achieved. Four big state banks dominate the market and allocate most of their
financial resources to the inefficient and loss-making state-owned  enterprise sector.  In
2000, three-quarters of all bank lending was channeled toward state-owned enterprises,
despite their plummeting contribution to national  output.
The coexistence of fast economic development and financial  deepening with a
massive misallocation of financial resources  in China is puzzling, as it does not follow
the expected  growth and finance relationship.  According to this literature, both
theoretical and empirical evidence  suggests a positive relationship between financial and
economic development,  and that the development  of financial markets  and institutions is
a critical and inextricable part of the growth process (Levine  1997). A crucial question is,
however, what is the direction of causality between the two processes,  e.g., whether
financial development passively follows economic development or whether  it is an
important determinant of economic  growth.  Given the endogenous nature of the
relationship,  cross-countries studies have usually relied on instrumentation techniques to
extract the exogenous  component of financial development.  The availability of new
econometric techniques for analyzing  panel data that control for endogeneity,  however,  is
providing impetus to the empirical  literature on finance and growth.'
This paper analyzes the relationship between growth and financial intermediation
in China by applying the traditional cross-country empirical framework to a panel of
Chinese provinces.  A number of studies have analyzed the growth patterns of the Chinese
provinces, with a focus on the role of openness,  foreign direct investment, or
infrastructure2. The impact of financial intermediation on growth has received little
attention,  which is surprising given the importance of the issue in terms of policy
implications and the challenges  posed by the increase of competition in the financial
' See Levine, Loayza,  and Beck. (1999).
2 See among others,  Chen and Fleisher (1996), Jian, Sachs, and Warner (1996), Raiser (1998),
Demurger and others (2002).
1sector that will follow China's accession to the World Trade Organization  (WTO).3 One
could argue that studying the relationship between finance  and growth at the intranational
level is meaningless  because intranational  capital markets are assumed to be perfectly
integrated. Available  evidence, however,  suggests the existence of a credit channel at the
local level.4 For instance, Hansen, McPherson,  and Waller (2000) show that even in a
financially developed economy such as the United  States local banks affect the
performance  of the local economy. In the case of China, the assumption of perfect capital
mobility is even more questionable,  given the strong presumption of local market
fragmentation regarding goods, labor, and capital.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 characterizes  China's banking
development by comparing the value of financial intermediation  indicators  in this country
with an international  sample of countries. Section 2 documents  the evidence of capital
market fragmentation in China, relying on previous evidence and on a test for capital
mobility between the Chinese provinces.  Section 4 presents the methodology used to
analyze the impact of the local  banking sector development on local economic
performance  and estimates the impact of the local banking  sector development on local
economic performance  in China. Section 5 concludes.
2.  FinanciaR  lEnternmiediation  in China: Mltnernnanfional  Comparison
According to Levine (1997), the financial sector contributes to economic growth
through five main channels: (1) facilitating the trading, hedging, diversifying, and
pooling of risk; (2) allocating resources; (3) monitoring managers  and exerting corporate
control; (4) mobilizing savings; and (5) facilitating the exchange of goods and services.
Ideally, we want to select indicators that reflect the quality of financial services when
analyzing the impact of financial intermediation on economic growth.  However,  only
quantitative indicators are available in a wide enough range to make cross-country
comparisons.  The three indicators of banking sector development are traditionally
defined as follows.5 The first indicator, usually used as a measure of financial depth, is
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, including currency and demand and interest-bearing
deposits of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries.  The underlying assumption is
that the quality of financial services  is positively correlated with the size of the financial
intermediary  sector. The second indicator of financial intermediation is the ratio of
commercial  bank assets to commercial bank and central banks assets. It measures the
degree to which commercial  banks versus the central bank allocate society's savings, and
3  See Li and Liu (2001), who study the impact of investment financing sources on industrial growth;
Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2000), who introduce in their growth regression  financial variables  among other
variables of interest; and Park and Sehrt (2001), who develop empirical tests of financial intermediation.
4 See Hansen McPherson and Waller (2000), Samolky (1994) and Neely and Wheelock (1997).
5 See Beck, Demirgil9-Kunt,  and Levine (2000).
2assumes implicitly that the banks perform better than the central  bank in allocating
financial resources.  The third-  and last indicator of financial  intermediation is the ratio of
credit extended by financial  intermediaries  to the private sector to GDP, as opposed to
governments,  government agencies, and public enterprises.  The assumption is that
financial systems that allocate more credit to private firms are more engaged in
researching firms, exerting control,  providing risk management  services, mobilizing
savings, and facilitating transactions than financial  systems that simply funnel credit to
the government or state-owned enterprises.
We calculate these three  indicators for China and the 78 countries included  in the
financial  dataset of the World Bank (Beck, Demirguic-Kunt,  and Levine 2000) for the
years  1979 (the beginning of the reform period in China), 1985  (the year following the
central bank creation People's Bank of China), and 1999 (the most recent year of data
availability6).  The 79 observations are subsequently sorted by ascending order for each
year in order to locate China within the sample.
China's financial deepening is impressive.  Financial depth measured by the ratio
of total bank liquidity to GDP has increased  from 33 percent of GDP in 1979 to  148
percent in 1999. When compared to an international  set of countries, China's liquidity
rate ranks among the highest in the world in the late  1990s-only Switzerland  and Malta
have higher liquidity ratios (Figure la). By contrast, China ranked 37th among the 79
countries in 1979 (Figure 1  b). What are the factors accounting  for such a dramatic
increase in real monetary 6alances? First, an increase in monetary transactions  has been
generated by the monetization of the economy,  defined as the increase of the amount of
transactions going through the market pushed by a combination of factors:  the de-
collectivization  of agriculture, the development of rural industry, and the development of
free markets together with the gradual withdrawal of state monopolies. Hence,  the ratio
of money (MI)  to GDP has increased from  19 percent in 1978 to 53 percent in  1999. Real
balances for savings have grown even faster. The ratio of quasi-money has increased
from 10 percent in 1978 to 81  percent in  1999. This financial deepening  can be explained
by the change in income distribution from the government to the households over the
transition period because of dismantling state monopolies and the rapid development of
the non-state economy. The increase  in the household  saving propensity can be explained
by several factors.  First, economic growth  increased the saving rate along with higher
expectations of future income.  Another growth-related  factor is the diversification of
needs stemming from improved living standards and the availability of new consumption
6  In the World Bank database, end-of-year  financial balance  sheet items are deflated by indices and
the GDP series is deflated  by average  consumer prices.  For comparing China's financial  indicators  with
international values, we simply use nominal  figures, thereby implicitly  assuming a common deflator  for
numerators and denominators.
7 Friedman (1957) and Kraay (2000)  find that expectations of future  income growth are an important
determinant of household  saving in China.
3goods. Credit constraint plays an important role also. Consumer credit is just starting to
develop in China and households face a cash-in-advance  constraint for consuming or
investing.  Demographic factors such as an increase in life expectancy  and an aging
population also matter. In addition, growing employment opportunities  in the non-state
sector with limited social welfare by contrast with the state sector have increased future
income uncertainties and precautionary  savings. Finally, the guarantee of deposits in the
state banks has kept household savings in the form of monetary assets despite the
emergence of alternative ways of saving (stock market, government bonds, and more
recently private housing).  The state banks have been asked to channel savings to the loss-
making state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However,  their ability to do so depends critically
on the savers' behavior and their willingness to place funds in the state-banking sector.
As a result, the government commitment to bailout the state-owned enterprises  has
resulted in an implicit guarantee of the deposits in the state-owned  banks (SOB).
Turning to the second indicator,  China's share of commercial  bank credit in total
credit to the economy equals 94 percent of GDP in  1985 and 98 percent of GDP in 1999,
situating the country in the upper quartile of the sample, at a level similar to
industrialized countries  such as Canada or United  States (Figures 2b and 2a,
respectively).  In other words, the role of the People's Bank of China in credit allocation
appears relatively modest. Interpreting this result as a signal of efficiency can be however
misleading given the two weaknesses  associated with this indicator (see Levine  1997).
First, banks are not the only financial intermediaries providing financial functions and,
second, banks may lend to the government or public enterprises.  The first pitfall is not
likely to create serious biases in the case of China, as the financial system remains mostly
bank-based.  In the late 1  990s the non-banking  financial institutions market share of loans
was barely  16 percent. The second weakness is of bigger concern for China, as the four
state-owned  banks dominate the banking sector and have a preferential policy toward
lending to state-owned enterprises.  The third and last indicator of financial
intermediation-the  ratio of credit going to the private sector-might thus be more
relevant for characterizing  China's banking sector.
Chinese  SOEs are famous for inefficiency. Despite two decades of incremental
reform, the role of state enterprises  in China's economy has shrunk in most ways except
the proportion of bank lending they consume. In 2000, SOEs accounted for less than one-
quarter of industrial output and just over one-third of urban formal employment.  Yet
conservative estimates suggest they absorbed  three-quarters of all bank lending in the late
1990s.8 This high figure reflects the use of the state-owned bank credit by the
8  Data is from the Economist  Intelligence Unit, "China:  Grossly Distorted Product," February  18,
2002. Chinese statistics do not provide direct figures for loans to SOEs. Estimates are calculated by
assuming that all lending aside that recorded for foreign invested enterprises,  township and village
enterprises, and "other"  goes to the state sector.
4government  as a policy instrument to support the state  sector.9 In other words, the state-
owned banks have been obliged to support the SOEs, despite and  because of the low
profitability of  the latter and their inability to repay their debts.' 0 Using an estimate of the
share of total credit directed to state enterprises of 90 percent in  1985 and 77.5 percent in
1999, the ratio of private credit to GDP would be 7 percent in 1985 and 14 percent in
1999, which ranks China as  4th and  15th among 79 countries respectively (Figure 3b and
3a). Hence, the allocation of credit shows little improvements  during the reform period.
At the end of the 1  990s, the bulk of credit is still directed to the public sector in China,
despite the growing evidence of its structural inefficiency.
To summarize, at the national level China's financial intermediation can be
characterized on the one hand by a dramatic financial  deepening and on the other hand by
a massive misallocation of financial  resources. In other words, while the financial  sector
has managed to facilitate the exchange of goods and services and mobilize  savings, it has
not yet succeeded in allocating resources efficiently.  In the following  section, we justify
the existence of a local channel between financial  intermediation  and growth using
evidence  from capital market fragmentation within China. In section 4, we analyze the
impact of banking development  on local performance.
3.  Capital Market Fragmentation in China
In a fully integrated financial system, households  should be able to deposit or
invest their savings and firms should be able to borrow anywhere in the economy either
through the banking system or through the financial markets.  As a result, and after
controlling for aggregate shocks, lending by a region's banks and local economic
performance  should be uncorrelated.  Therefore, as a prerequisite for analyzing the impact
of local banking development on the local economy  in China, we wish to evaluate the
degree of capital market fragmentation  in China.
China's spatial economic organization is described as a de facto federalism,
involving a decentralized economic system in which each region can be considered as an
autonomous economic entity in terms of both goods and production factors.'  Several
studies have pointed out that the level of inter-provincial  trade in China resembles a loose
federation of sovereign states rather than a unified country.'2 In contrast to the well-
documented patterns of intra-national  trade, no formal study is available on the degree of
9 With  the  deterioration  of its fiscal  position  in  the  1980s,  the government  increasingly  shifted  the
fiscal burden onto banks, thereby converting direct subsidies to firms into bank loans.
10  It is now commonly  estimated  that non-performing  loans account now for 30 to 40 percent of the
state banks' total lending.
'" See Qian and Xu (1993).
12 See Poncet (2001).
5intra-national  capital mobility in China, although the available information  supports the
view of a high degree of capital market fragmentation.'3
We estimate  the degree of capital mobility within the Chinese provinces by
applying the test proposed by Feldstein and  Horioka (1980) for international capital
mobility' 4. The Feldstein-Horioka  (F-H) test for capital mobility relies on the idea that,
under the null hypothesis of a perfectly  integrated capital market, investment in one
region should not be constrained by the available  savings in that region and the
correlation between local savings and local investment should be low. Conversely,  if
regional capital markets are fragmented,  domestic investment may be closely related to
domestic saving as a source of finance.  The F-H test may not be ideal in a cross-country
context,  as it does not give conclusive evidence  on the degree of international capital
market integration.  Furthermore,  a low saving-investment  correlation can be consistent
with various alternatives  other than a low degree of capital market integration across
countries,  such as the presence of currency devaluation risk premiums, and government's
efforts to target the level of current account balance  by manipulating the exchange rate.
However,  within a country, the F-H test turns out to be a reasonable indicator of the
degree of capital market integration  across different regions,  as the alternative
interpretations  mentioned above  are not operative  within a country. For example, out of
six papers that have looked at countries that are known to have an integrated capital
market internally  (Canada,  Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States),
all have found a very low savings-investment  correlation  across the regions.' 5 This
provides the justification for using the F-H test to examine  capital market integration
within China.
For our sample we use 26 Chinese provinces  between  1985 and 2000. The
investment rate is the share of gross capital formation  in GDP. The saving rate is defined
as the ratio of the difference  between GDP and total consumption over GDP. 1 6 Figure 4
shows the relation between saving  and investment  rates averaged  over the period. Two
features deserve attention:  first, no clear relationship emerges from the cross-sectional
dimension.  Second, Beijing,  Shanghai, and Tianjin appear  as outliers.'7 We therefore
" The World Bank (1994) finds no evidence of price or returns to capital convergence across
provinces  as would be the  case if  provinces  were financially  integrated.  Also Park and  Sehrt (2001)  find
that deposits  are a key determinant of lending given the poor intermediation across institutions and between
and within provinces.  The importance  of deposits  in determining  the volume of local lending has also
increased over time between  1991  and 1997.
14 See Boyreau-Debray  and  Wei  (2002).
15 Bayoumi and Rose (1993),  Dekle (1996),  Iwamoto and van Wincoop  (2000),  Sinn (1992),  Thomas
(1993), Yamori (1995).
16 We have tested for the order of integration of the series using panel unit-root tests (Im,  Pesaran, and
Shin  1995). Both investment and saving rates are stationary.
7  Moreover,  including  municipalities  for  testing  capital  mobility  might  not  be  relevant  as  capital
mobility between the cities and the surrounding provinces is  likely to be high.
6estimate the correlation between investment and saving with and without the three
municipalities.
Turning to the panel regressions, we use a simple within estimator with individual
and time-fixed effects.  In a subnational context, time dummies control for national shocks
or macro policies that may increase simultaneously  saving and investment for a given
degree of capital mobility.  Table 1 reports the results. Unlike the results of the previous
subnational studies, the investment rate is significantly positively related to savings (row
I a, Table  1  a).  We check the robustness of the results by first using an alternative measure
of investment,  by subtracting  the share of investment financed by the central government
(row 2a, Table I a). Although  lower, the investment-saving  correlation  remains
significant.  Second, potential biases arising from saving endogeneity with investment are
controlled by running 2SLS regressions,  using the share of food expenditure  in total
consumption expenditure  as an instrument (Kraay 2000). The positive correlation
between investment and saving remains significant  (Table Ib) . Overall, the results
contrast with the usual finding of the literature,  which finds no investment-saving
correlation at the subnational  level. Instead, the correlations  appear closer to cross-
country investment-saving  correlations,  supporting the view of a low degree of capital
mobility within Chinese provinces.  The results show that China still has a long way to go
to reach financial integration.  But more importantly  for our purpose, they provide a
justification for analyzing the impact of local financial intermediation on local growth
performance.
4.  Financial Intermediation and Growth: Subnational Evidence
This section presents an empirical analysis of the impact of local  banking sector
on provincial growth performance.  First, we present the growth equation to estimate and
discuss the econometric  method as well as the economic  and banking indicators used on
the right-hand side.  Second, we present and discuss the results.
4.1  Empirical  Framework
The data set consists of economic  and financial  statistics for 26 Chinese provinces
and 3 municipalities directly under central government control between 1990 and 1999.
All variables are averaged over two years, providing five observations per province. 1 8 We
estimate the following growth equation:
y,t =ao  Yt-T + a,X,1 + a2F, 1+ u,  + t+  e,  (1)
18 Averaging all the variables over two years results from  a compromise between  controlling for short-
term shocks  on the one hand and on the other hand keeping  enough observations  given the length of the
time series (10 years).  For variable definitions  and statistical  sources see the appendix.  Due to missing
values, Tibet is excluded from the sample.
7where y is the real GDP per capita (in logarithm),  T is the period length, X is a vector of
control variables (or the conditioning information set), F is a vector of financial
intermediation  indicators, m is a province fixed effect, t is a time fixed effect, and e is the
error term, and i and t are, respectively, the provincial  and time subscripts.
4.1.1  Econometric  Method: GMM System Estimator
Equation  (1) confronts us with two econometric  issues. First, introducing the lagged
dependent variable among the regressors together with fixed individual effects  renders
the OLS estimator biased  and inconsistent even if the e,t are not serially correlated, as the
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term. Second, most of the
explanatory variables  can be expected to be endogenous with economic  growth.  We thus
need to control for endogeneity arising either from the dynamic specification of the
equation or from reverse causation.  The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)  is
usually used to control for endogeneity  arising in panel data models. The first difference
GMM estimator, as proposed by Arellano  and Bond (1991), involves as a first step taking
the first difference of the proposed equation in order to remove the fixed individual
effects from the equation. However, in the differenced  equation, the error term is still
correlated with the lagged dependent variable. The second step consists of instrumenting
the explanatory  variables.  Under the assumption that there is no serial correlation in the
error term, the lagged levels of the explanatory variables can be used as instruments of
the first differenced variables.  In the context of economic growth models, this method has
the advantage of avoiding biases related to omitted  specific individual effects  and to
control for endogeneity arising from bi-directional  causality.  One critical assumption is,
however, that lagged levels of variables are good instruments  for explaining subsequent
first differences.  Hence, when the time-series are persistent and the number of time-series
is small, which is typically the case in the empirical growth models, the first-differenced
GMM estimator is shown to behave poorly (Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple, 2001). In
particular, these authors show that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable tends
to be below the corresponding coefficient estimate in the within groups, suggesting
GMM first-differences  are biased. In the case of growth models, Bond and others (2001)
recommend the use of the so-called  System-GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond  1998),
which uses the information contained  in the initial conditions to generate efficient
estimators when T is small and variables are highly persistent. The basic idea of this
estimator is to use lagged  first differences of the variables as instruments for the equation
in levels in combination with the usual approach.  In the next section, the System-GMM
estimator is used for estimating growth equations with financial intermediation
indicators. Next, we use the System-GMM method to estimate equation (1).
84.1.2  The Data
Control Variables (Conditioning Information Set)
The vector of control variables Xis defined according to the augmented  Solow
model as proposed by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). We introduce  the investment
rate as a proxy for physical  capital and the share of population  with more than secondary
schooling as a proxy for human capital (schooling).  ' 9 Here we depart from the traditional
specification used in the empirics on finance and growth, which usually do not introduce
the investment rate, and use the initial rather than the contemporary value of human
capital in order to avoid biases arising from potential endogeneity of factor accumulation
with economic growth.20 This method, however, gives rise to another bias due to omitted
variables as long as physical and human capital accumulation is considered a relevant
determinant of economic growth.  As emphasized  by Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple (2001),
the System-GMM methodology allows parameters to be estimated consistently in models
with endogenous right-hand side variables by using instrumental variables. We therefore
include the current values of physical and human capital accumulation while controlling
for endogeneity.  The share of non-state production (non-state production)  and the ratio of
foreign direct investment to GDP (Fdi) are introduced as control variables. The former is
an indicator of the macro environment of the local economy (or of the progress of the
transition process at the local level) whereas the latter captures the provincial degree of
integration to the world economy.
Local Indicators  of Financial  Intermediation
At the subnational level, none of the three banking development indicators
traditionally used in cross-country studies as described above is available. We therefore
build four indicators of financial  intermediation corresponding as closely as possible to
the cross-country ones.  Given that information  on cash distribution among regions  is not
available, we simply use the ratio of total deposits of the banking system to GDP as an
indicator of the size of the local banking sector (SIZE).  Similarly, central bank credit is
not available at the province level. Following Lardy (1998) and Dayal-Gulati  and
Hussain (2002), we use the ratio of loans to deposits of the state-owned banks as a proxy
for central bank lending to the provinces (CENTRAL).  In China, while the volume of
deposits is determined by economic activity, the volume of lending was largely
determined by policy objectives, through the credit plan and independently of the ability
of branch banks in each region to finance  the lending target from local deposits (Lardy
1998). Hence, some rapidly  growing provinces could have a low credit quota and be
19  We thank Colin Xu for kindly providing  us with the schooling  series.
20 This specification  is proposed by Barro and Sala-I-Martin  (1992) and justified by the need to
control for differences  in steady states of the economies depending on their structural features  and initial
conditions.
9constrained in their lending relative to the rapid growth of their deposits. Alternatively,
branch banks in slower growing regions could be assigned high quotas with insufficient
local deposits to finance their lending; and these provinces depended on the central banks
to lend them additional funds. Hence, the ratio of SOB credit to SOB deposits provides a
measure of the central bank credit to the local branch banks to meet their lending quotas.
In the recent years, the administrative targets have been phased out and replaced by a
maximum ratio between loans and deposits. The ratios apply to total national lending by
individual banks but allow the headquarters to alter credit allocation for specific
provinces.21  Therefore, the ratio of loans to deposits can also be interpreted as a measure
of interregional  fund allocation,  as the state banks are provided with greater flexibility to
use within bank transfers to adjust regional  needs.
The third indicator of financial intermediation  is the ratio of state-owned banks
credit to GDP (SOB). As already  noted, Chinese statistics  do not provide  any information
on credit allocation between state and non-state enterprises. However, given that the state
banks' primary function was to channel savings to state-owned  enterprises,  the ratio of
the state-owned banks credit to GDP can be interpreted  as a proxy for the credit
channeled to the state-owned sector. For instance,  80 percent of the total amount of credit
by the state-owned bank was extended to the state-owned enterprises in the late 1  990s.
Even with the recent emphasis on profit maximization and management responsibility in
the state banking sector, the state banks may still favor the SOEs with which they have a
long customer history and which are more likely to be bailed out by the government than
non-state enterprises in the case of financial troubles. By contrast, projects in the non-
state sector are perceived as more risky because of higher information costs and moral
hazard.
Finally,  we are interested in assessing whether for a given size of the banking
sector its structure matters for local economic growth in China.  Since  1984 the initially
specialized state banks have  been allowed to compete for deposits and loans in each
other's previously monopolized  markets,  and enterprises have been allowed to open
accounts with more than one bank.22 Existing evidence suggests that all the state banks
have remained largely involved in the same specialized business areas.  However, the
development of new financial institutions including national and regional non-state
banks, urban and rural credit cooperatives,  and non-banking financial institutions has
increased the competition for deposits. More importantly, following China's recent WTO
accession, foreign banks will be entitled to national treatment without geographic or
21  It is questionable whether state banks are actually conforming to these  ratios, as the ratios of
outstanding loans to total deposits remain well above the authorized  ceiling.
22  When the People's Bank of China was granted the authority of a central bank in 1984, its
commercial  operations were transferred to four specialized  banks: the Agricultural  Bank of China for the
rural sector, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China for the industrial sector, the People's Bank
Construction  Bank of  China for long-tcrm  investment;  and the Bank of China for foreign exchange.
10customer restrictions within five years. Hence, the banking sector is about to face strong
and intensive competitive pressures from large foreign financial institutions. However,  as
highlighted by Huang and Qian (2001), the banking and sector is different from the real
sector where more competition is considered better, as an increase  in competition on the
financial side creates a tradeoff between banking stability and banking efficiency.  Indeed
two main outcomes can result from the weakening  of the monopolistic position of the
state-banking sector. First, increased  competition may result in a drop of saving deposits
in the state banks, in turn threatening their ability to finance the state-owned sector and
overall financial stability, as the system rests on the continuing willingness of savers to
deposit much of their income with state banks. Second,  increased bank competition may
result in improved efficiency of financial  resources allocation and improved access to
credit of the non-state sector, thereby fostering economic growth.23 We use a fourth
indicator to account for the banking market structure in the provinces, by calculating an
Herfindahl index of bank concentration.  If n is the number of banks, i the province and t
the period, the index is computed as follows:
H,, = i  D1 ,  *(2)
J=  /  J=1
Where Dj,,,t, is the deposits for ba  kj, the index equals one in case of monopoly and 1/n
in case of equal shares among the n banks. The available data allows us to distinguish
between n=7 financial institutions, e.g., the four state-owned banks (Agriculture  Bank of
China, Industrial  and Commercial  Bank of China, Bank of China, Construction Bank of
China), the Bank of Communication,  the Rural Credit Cooperatives  and the "other
financial  institutions." Using the deposits of each  financial institution, we compute  the
bank concentration index for each of the 29 regions (26 provinces  and 3 municipalities)
and the 5 periods (CONCENTRATION).
4.2  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table 2a reports the average value of the control variables and the four banking
indicators. The latter exhibit considerable variation across provinces.  For instance, SIZE
ranges from 60 percent of GDP in Hunan or Anhui to 274 percent of GDP in Beijing
municipality or 115 percent of GDP in Shanxi province.  SOB is as high as  107 percent  in
Qinghai but only of  41  percent of GDP in Zhejiang. The pattern of central bank credit to
the provinces is also uneven.  In Jilin state bank, credit is 1.7 time higher than deposits,
whereas in Beij in, Guangdong, or Zhejiang credit outstanding does not even match
23  Theoretical arguments can  be found to support either a positive or a negative effect of bank
concentration on economic  growth.  On the one hand, a lower bank concentration results in a higher amount
of credit available for the economy as a whole. Banks with monopoly power would determine an
equilibrium with higher loan rates and a smaller quantity of loanable funds. On the other hand, the positive
effect derives  from the greater incentive for monopolistic  banks to establish lending relationships,  which in
turn promotes  firms' access to investment funds.  Using a cross-country  data set over the period 1989-1996
and several indicators of  bank concentration,  Cetorelli and Gambera (2001)  find, however, that bank
concentration has a negative effect on industrial  growth.deposits (0.86).  Finally, the market structure of the banking sector in the provinces varies.
The provinces  associated with the lowest degree of concentration are Shanxi and Jiangsu
(0.18), with 0.14 as a benchmark of equal shares among the seven banks. At the opposite
extreme come Beijing (0.29) municipality,  and Nei Mongolia, Qinghai, Jilin,  and
Liaoning provinces (0.25).
Table 2b reports the correlations  between  the  set of control variables and the
banking indicators.  All control variables are positively and highly correlated with each
other. The investment rate in GDP is likely to be associated with a high level of human
capital (correlation of 0.94), a large share of non-state sector production (correlation of
0.85), as well as a relatively higher ratio of foreign investment in GDP (correlation of
0.96). Similarly, a relatively high share of non-state production is accompanied by a high
level of foreign investment in GDP.  Similarly, two of the four financial indicators are
highly positively correlated:  a high rate of SOB loans in GDP is associated with a high
level of central bank credit to the province, which is not surprising given the importance
of this financing for SOB.  SOB is also highly correlated with CONCENTRATION.  A
relatively high rate of SOB loans also indicates a high degree of concentration of the
banking sector. Finally, Table 2b shows the correlation between the four financial
indicators and the set of control variables:  Size does seem to be related to any of the
growth determinants while  SOB, Central and Concentration are all highly negatively
correlated with the share of non-state production, Fdi, and, to a lower extent, investment
rate.
Figures 5 to 8 show the relations between the four averaged banking indicators
and the growth rate of GDP per capita and the initial level of GDP per capita,
respectively.  Regarding the overall size of the local banking sector, the municipalities of
Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai have the highest levels of deposit to GDP ratio, of initial
GDP per capita and of per capita GDP growth rate. In contrast to cross-country  studies
that highlight a positive correlation between the size of the banking sector and growth of
GDP per capita,  a slightly negative relationship  emerges between financial depth and the
growth of per capita GDP (Figures 5. la and 5.2a). Fast growing provinces such as Fujian,
Zhejiang,  Shandong Jiangsu Hebei, Hubei, and Anhui are associated with a low ratio of
total deposits to GDP, whereas provinces with the highest values of deposits to GDP have
been growing at a somewhat lower rate (Guangdong,  Shaanxi, Shanxi, Ningxia, Gansu
and Xinjiang). No clear relation can be seen from Figures 5.1b. and 5.2b between the size
of the banking sector and the initial  level of GDP per capita. One has to keep  in mind that
a key assumption underlying the use of the ratio of deposits to GDP as an indicator of
financial development  is that the size of financial intermediary  sector should be positively
correlated to the provision and quality of financial  services. This assumption is
questionable  for China, given the quasi-monopoly of the state-owned banks and their
12poor performance in allocating resources efficiently.  The other indicators  that consider
the state sector might prove more relevant for China.
Central bank lending seems to be preferably allocated in provinces  with lower
growth of per capita GDP (Figure 6.a).  Similarly, there is a negative  correlation between
the ratio of SOB lending to GDP and the real growth rate of GDP per capita (Figure 7.a).
No clear relation can be detected between central bank or state bank lending and the
initial GDP per capita (Figures 6.b and 7.b, respectively).  Provinces such as Jilin, Hubei,
Qinghai, and Nei Mongolia benefit the most from central bank lending but are neither the
poorest nor the richest provinces.  By contrast, some of poorest provinces  such as
Guangxi or Yunnan receive little credit from the central bank. Beijing's deposits exceed
by far its corresponding value of credit,  suggesting that the capital city is a net contributor
to the central bank resources.
Depending on the causality between those two negative relationships, two
different interpretations  are proposed.  In the first case-GDP growth to central bank SOB
lending-provinces where the state sector dominates the local economy such as Qinghai,
Jilin or Nei Mongolia may suffer from higher rigidities in their labor and product markets
which could be in turn be reflected in lower economic performance. The government may
compensate those provinces for this structural handicap by softening their budget
constraint and providing them with easier access to credit.  The other interpretation
involves a reverse causality-from SOB lending to economic growth-which would
suggest that SOBs are less efficient at allocating resources  than other financial
institutions, leading to lower growth performance  in the provinces where SOBs dominate
the local financial sector.
A negative relationship between CONCENTRATION  and the growth of per
capita GDP emerges from Figure  8.a, suggesting that a monopolistic banking sector  is
less efficient than a banking sector where banks and enterprises have to compete for
scarce financial resources.  Bank concentration does not appear to be related with the level
of economic development (Figure 8.b). Provinces with similar levels of initial GDP per
capita can have very different banking structures with, for instance, middle-income
provinces of Qinghai, Nei Mongolia, Jilin Gansu having a relatively more concentrated
market than the richer provinces of Shandong, Shanxi,  Fujian, Hainan,  Hubei, or Hebei.
This statistical description  suggests several preliminary results.  First, the size of
the intermediation sector does not appear to be related to the level of development or to
local growth performance.  Second, provinces with a lower rate of economic growth
receive larger credit flows from the central  government.  Third, higher market
concentration  is associated with lower growth performance  at the local level. Fourth, the
three municipalities exhibit outlying features. Finally,  according to the correlations
between all the explanatory  variables, it seems that a higher share of the non-state sector
13is associated with mnore  foreign investment,  a lower ratio of state bank loans in GDP, less
credit from the central bank, and less concentration in the banking sector.
These bivariate correlations do not, however, allow us to discriminate  between the
different interrelated hypotheses such as the causality between financial development and
growth, the state banking overall performance, the impact of the central bank lending and
the effect of bank concentration on local real growth. In the next section, we estimate the
significance of financial intermediation on growth by estimating growth equations and
controlling for the potential endogeneity of the regressors.
4.3  Econometric Estimation
Table 3a reports the estimates of equation (1), using only the investment rate and
the schooling variables as control variables.  As suggested by the statistical evidence
provided in the previous section, we treat Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai as outliers by
excluding them from the sample. Moreover,  including municipalities in the context of the
growth and finance relationship would be questionable as capital mobility is likely to be
high between these cities and their surrounding provinces.24
Surprisingly, the liquidity indicator has a significant negative impact on economic
growth, which contrasts sharply with the usual cross-country result of a positive
relationship between the size of the financial sector and economic  growth (Table 3a,
column la). As mentioned before in section 2, financial deepening during the reform
period has been impressive at the national level,  although not accompanied  by an
improvement in savings allocation. At the regional  level, interior provinces with a
relatively lower growth performance  are associated with a high ratio of deposits to GDP.
Therefore,  the implicit assumption that the size of the financial sector is positively
correlated to the quality of financial services is questionable in the case of China.  A high
level of this indicator may not prefigure a high level of financial intermediation
development.  Park and Sehrt (2001) reach a similar conclusion:  they find an inverse
relationship between the rate of financial intermediation  and the level of economic
development among Chinese provinces,  suggesting factors other than economic
fundamentals play an important role in lending decisions.
State-owned  bank credit has a negative  and significant impact on local economic
growth, supporting the hypothesis that the state-banking  sector does not allocate savings
efficiently and that provinces with a more developed non-state financial sector may
benefit from more efficient resource allocation.  Similarly, the more credit a province
receives from the central bank, the lower its growth performance  (columns 2a and 3a
24  Indeed, when the three  municipalities are included, none of the financial  indicators are significant
(results available  from author).
14respectively).25 Keeping in mind that we control for the endogeneity of the regressors, the
direction of causality  can be interpreted as running  from the central bank lending to
economic  growth. At first glance, this result seems puzzling:  increased availability of
financial resources can be thought of as having a positive or insignificant impact on
economic  growth, but can hardly be thought of as worsening local economic
performance.  Central bank lending can, however, affect local growth performance in a
negative way by softening the local budget constraint. Following  Komai (1980), an
organization is said to have a soft budget constraint when it expects to be bailed out in
case of financial trouble.26 For instance, some unprofitable  enterprises will become
profitable only if they undergo  restructuring.  But since it is costly for an enterprise to
restructure,  it will only do so if the enterprise would otherwise go bankrupt.  Therefore, if
the enterprise anticipates that it will be bailed out by the government, it will not
restructure.  In the case of China, the state-banking  sector has been used by the
government as a quasi-fiscal instrument to bailout loss-making state enterprises  or to
deliver specific policy loans  without consideration  for efficiency.  The result has been a
growing accumulation of non-performing loans.  In compensation for their lack of
autonomy, the SOEs were implicitly guaranteed bailouts by the central  bank. Given the
easy  access to central-bank refinancing  and the government's commitment to support the
state sector,  the budget constraint of the state banks is likely to be soft. Thus, the finding
of a negative impact of central bank lending on local economic growth can be interpreted
as a lack of incentives for the state banks to improve their management  or base their
lending decisions on efficiency criteria,  as they expect the central bank to fulfill their
losses. Furthermore,  this result supports the idea that the state-owned bank management
has not improved in the recent years despite reforms aimed at transforming them into
commercial  banks responsible for their losses.27 Greater bank concentration is
significantly associated with lower economic growth and remains robust when the size of.
the intermediary  sector is also introduced (columns  4a and  5a, respectively).  This result
supports the idea that bank competition is likely to: improve economic performance as
found by Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) using a cross-country sample.  It is also
consistent with the evidence  shown at the micro level by Cull, Shen, and Xu (2002) that
greater entry into the banking sector improves bank performance,  which in turn improves
resource allocation  in the province  and leads to higher economic growth.  Table 3a also
presents the Sargan test for instrument validity, where the null hypothesis states that the
instrumefital  variables are uncorrelated with the residuals, and the serial correlation test,
23  When introducing the ratio of loans to deposits, Dayal-Gulati  and Hussain  (2002) find the same
result during the  1988-97  period.
26  See Maskin and Xu (2001)  for a review of soft budget constraints.
27 Park and Sehrt (2001)  analyze financial intermediation  efficiency in China between 1991 and  1997
and draw a similar conclusion: "financial  intermediation in China is far from efficient and that financial
reforms in'the midl1990s have not reversed  a worsening trend."
15where the null is that the errors exhibit no second order serial correlation.  There is no
evidence of second order serial correlation and the validity of the instruments cannot be
rejected, as shown by the insignificance of test statistics.
The difficulty here is to interpret the three indicators of financial intermediation
separately, as they are all closely interrelated.  For instance, one can argue that a high
level of state-owned bank credit is likely to be explained by the predominance of the
state-owned  enterprises on the real side of the local economy.  As the state-owned banks
lend mainly to state-owned enterprises,  the negative growth impact of the credit they
extend can simply be explained by the poor performance  of their clients.  A high level of
state-bank credit is also likely to be translated into  a higher dependence  on central-bank
lending used to finance the shortfalls between loans and deposits in the SOBs. Similarly,
a high ratio of SOB loans to GDP in the local economy is likely to indicate a high degree
of banking sector concentration,  as the state banks dominate the banking  sector. Ideally,
we want to distinguish the state banks' negative impact on economic growth explained by
their intrinsic performance  from the negative impact arising from the importance of the
state-owned  corporate sector and more generally from a poor economic  climate. To do
this we run the same regressions while controlling for the significance of the state sector
in the local economy.
Figures 9 to 12 show the average levels of SIZE, SOB, CENTRAL and
CONCENTRATION  related to the share of non-state enterprises  in total  gross industrial
output value (sgovns). With the exception of SIZE, each of these indicators  is clearly
negatively correlated to the size of the non-state sector. For instance, provinces such as
Qinghai, Jilin, Nei Mongolia,  Ningxia, Jilin, Gansu, or Guizhou are characterized  by a
large share of state-industry and a high level of SOB credit, a high level of central-bank
lending, and a high bank concentration index. By contrast, the provinces of Zhejiang,
Jiangsu,  Shandong, Fujian, Henan have a higher share of non-state production,  rely less
on SOB credit, have a more diversified banking sector, and receive less central-bank
financing.  These provinces are thus less likely to receive  a large amount of policy loans
to support state industry. In addition to such arguments, the share of non-state sector
production is often used in studies of regional economic  growth  in China as an indicator
for structural macroeconomic  differences,  such as a differences  in the degree of goods
and labor market flexibility, differences in the progress of reforms,  and more generally
for the extent to which a market climate prevails in the province.
Table 3b reports the results when the share of industrial production by non-state-
enterprises  in total industrial production is added among the regressors. As found in
previous studies, provinces more advanced in the transition process benefit from a higher
rate of real growth, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of the share of the
non-state production.  Interestingly, the financial deepening variable is now insignificant
(column 2b). As a result its negative impact in the base model comes from the fact that
16the provinces with the highest liquidity rates are also the ones associated with the highest
share of state production,  meaning that a high ratio of deposits to GDP is more the result
of a preferential  credit policy than the result of financial deepening in the local economy.
Another interesting result is that the ratio of the share of SOB credit ceases to be
significant when we control for the importance of state-owned  industry at the local level.
Its negative impact in previous regressions was more related to the bad performance  of
the state enterprises than the misallocation of credit by the SOB per se (column 2b). The
negative effect of central-bank lending to the provinces and the bank concentration index
both remain significant when we control for the share of state-owned industry (columns
3b and 4b).
We are also interested in checking whether the good growth performance in some
Chinese provinces comes from easy access to foreign savings, e.g., mostly in the form of
foreign direct investment. Non-state  enterprises face different financing  constraints
depending on their access to foreign capital.  Some provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian,
or Hainan have received foreign direct investment ranging  from  1  1 to 14 percent of GDP
during the 1  990s, while more remote areas such as Ningxia, Nei Mongolia, Guizhou or
Yunnan provinces received almost nothing.28 Foreign investment is usually found to be a
general indicator of openness and a robust determinant of provincial growth.29 However,
when we introduce the ratio of foreign investment into our growth regressions (Table  3c),
foreign investment enters none of the regressions significantly while the other coefficient
estimates remain unchanged. 30 This latter result is in line with Carkovi and Levine (2002)
who find no evidence of a causal impact of foreign investment on economic growth once
the endogeneity of Fdi with economic growth is taken into account.
Now turning to the significance of the control variables, the results are somewhat
disappointing.  Physical capital  accumulation enters only three regressions  significantly
(column 4b in Table 3b and columns  lc and 2c in Table 3c) whereas human capital
accumulation  is only significant in one of the regressions  (column 3b in Table 3b). The
same result can be found in other empirical  studies of provincial growth in China. For
instance  Li, Liu, and Rebelo (1998)  and Aziz and Duenwald (2001)  find no evidence of a
significant contribution of physical capital accumulation to provincial growth in China.
Most of the previous studies do not introduce a proxy for human capital accumulation  or
use the secondary  school enrolment, which is only a rough proxy for the stock of human
capital in the provinces.3'  Although the share of population  in the province with more
28 See Table 2.
29 For more on the impact of China's open door policy see Lee  (1994), Mody and Wang (1997),  Chen
and Feng (2000),  and Demurger (2000).
30 The ratio of exports and imports to GDP  was also introduced  but never appeared to be significant.
3' Demurger (2001)  uses the share of population with more than secondary schooling, which is
calculated from the permanent  inventory method.
17than secondary schooling is a more accurate indicator, it may still suffer from
measurement error. More generally, such indicators only capture the level of capital
accumulation and do not provide information about the ability of the economy to allocate
factors efficiently.  In their analysis of the sources of economic growth in China, Wang
and Yao (2001) find rapid human capital accumulation  since  1952, and that both physical
and human capital contributed to China's growth performance  during the reform period.
These authors  also point out that given the rapid expansion of capital base, the relative
importance of factor accumulation may be declining in favor of total factor productivity
as the driving force for growth. Increasing total factor productivity depends on improving
the allocation of factors by reforming the state and financial sector and allowing both
capital and labor to move freely.32
Little evidence of conditional  (or beta) convergence  is found. As reported at the
bottom of Tables  3a and 3b, the coefficient  estimates of the lagged dependent variable  are
significantly  smaller than unity only in four regressions. How can this weak result of
conditional  convergence be explained?  First, because variables  are averaged over two
years, our estimates might capture both short-term (business cycles) and long-term
(structural) variations.  Second, the general consensus among studies of income per capita
convergence  among Chinese provinces is that the relative dispersion of income per capita
has decreased over the 1  980s and increased over the 1  990s, while beta-convergence  is
significant over both periods.33 However,  forces of beta-convergence  were stronger in the
pre- 1990 period and weaker in the  1990s. For instance, estimates over the whole reform
period range from 4.3  to 7.5  percent per year. When the period starts in the late  1980s or
early 1990s, the convergence coefficients range from  1.6 to 2.5 percent per year (see for
instance Aziz and Duenwald  2001 and Dayal-Gulati and Hussain 2002). When
significant, our estimates of GDP per capita convergence range at comparable levels,
from 2.6 to 4.6 percent per year (bottom of Table 3a and 3b).
Finally, another reason for an absence of convergence may lie in the econometric
technique.  Quite surprisingly and despite the well-known inefficiency of OLS or within
estimators for panel data when the lagged dependent variable is introduced among the
regressors,  few previous studies on growth empirics in China have relied on GMM
estimators.34 As Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple (2001) point out, using a OLS level
estimator for AR(1) models gives an estimate of the lagged dependent variable biased
upward in the presence of individual fixed effects, whereas within estimators give an
32 This conclusion  is similar to the one of Easterly  and Levine (2001) who find on a cross-section of
countries that the level of investment is not as important as its quality, and that TFP accounts  for most of
the variation in output.
33  See Aziz and Duenwald (2001) for a review of results on the convergence  of provincial  income per
capita in China.
34 One exception is the study of Aziz and Duenwald  (2001), which implements the  GMM-System
methodology.
18estimate biased downward in short panels.  Therefore,  finding out that the GMM estimate
of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable lies close to the corresponding within
parameter estimate can be considered as a signal that biases due to weak instruments may
be important.  Tables 4a and 4b report the estimates using first-differenced  GMM,  Within
Groups (Table 4a) and OLS (Table 4b) estimators, respectively.  The estimates of the
lagged dependent variable using a first-differenced  GMM estimator are close to the
corresponding  within ones, which are likely to be biased downward in a short panel. In
contrast, the estimate of the coefficient of the initial income using the GMM system lies
well above the corresponding within and below the OLS estimates. Overall, the results
suggest a bias problem caused by weak instruments in the first-differenced  GMM
estimates and by the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term in
the within estimates. Hence, the previous results on provincial  growth convergence using
within estimators most likely overstate the beta-convergence process between Chinese
provinces.
We also try out alternative  specifications in order to check the robustness of the
results. First, we drop the investment rate from the set of control variables  and estimate a
reduced form of equation (1) where investment rate is implicitly supposed to be a
function of the GDP growth rate. As mentioned earlier, the rate of investment  is highly
correlated with the schooling variable,  so estimating the reduced form of the growth
equation can help eliminate colinearities.  The results in Table 5a are very close to results
when the investment rate is part of the conditioning  set of variables. Hence estimating the
equation with or without investment does not seem to make a difference and colinearity is
unlikely to be important, as the schooling variable remains insignificant even when the
investment rate is left out of the regression.
Second, we introduce a coastal dummy among the regressors, the idea here being
coastal provinces have been growing more rapidly and their banking sector is
characterized  by a lower share of SOB credit, less credit received  by the central bank, and
a more diversified banking sector. Hence introducing a coastal dummy checks for
omitted variables that can create a spurious relation between the growth rate of per capita
GDP and the indicators of financial intermediation.  The results in Table  5b with a coastal
dummy introduced remain similar to that without any dummy, supporting the view that
the significance of the relations between the financial intermediation indicators and local
growth performance  does not come from any common feature of coastal areas not taken
into account in the regression.
Finally, we estimate equation (1)  over two five-years periods rather then five two-
years periods in order to evaluate sensitivity to cyclical  issues. Table 6 reports the
estimate using successively within (fixed individual effects) and Generalized  Least
Squares (random individual effects) estimators.  Both estimators lead to qualitatively
19similar results for the financial indicators35: Size has either the "wrong" sign or is
insignificant while SOB has a negative sign and is significant when fixed effects are
used. CENTRAL is significantly negative while  CONCENTRATION  has a negative
sign, although significant only in the GLS specification.  Overall, using a longer period to
avoid cyclical trends leads to similar results.
5.  Conclusion
This paper examines  the relationship between financial intermediation and local
economic  growth in China. It appears that because of capital market fragmentation, the
unevenness  in banking development is an important factor  in local economic
performance.  We find that China's financial deepening, as exceptional  as it is, does not
contribute to local economic performance,  as shown by the insignificance of the ratio of
deposits to GDP.  Furthermore,  the banking sector's continued support of loss-making
state-sector enterprises over non-state enterprises is reflected in the negative  impact of
state and central-bank  lending on economic growth. More precisely, the negative impact
of state-bank credit is not a matter of financial performance per se, but more the result of
the burden of supporting  the state-owned sector.  Indeed, when we control  for the state
corporate size in the local economy,  the state banks' negative  impact on growth ceases to
be significant.  This finding suggests that improving  state bank performance  and more
generally financial resource allocation  would necessitate  first reforming the state
corporate  sector and improving the economic climate at the local level. Another
important result with policy implications  is that provinces with a more diversified
banking sector have performed better in terms of economic growth. In the short term, it
would be advisable for China to relax restrictions on entry into the banking sector in
order to prepare the economy for the strong competitive pressures  likely to come from
foreign banks with China's accession to the WTO.
Finally, traditional determinants of economic growth do not appear to explain
local economic growth in China over the  1990s. For instance, foreign direct and domestic
investments are insignificant most of the time. Another example is the somewhat
worrisome no-convergence  result of per capita income over the period. Poorer provinces
do not catch up to richer ones,  even after controlling for a set of conditioning factors.
While part of the reason for these unconventional results may be the period under study
or the short panel dimension, a more important explanation lies in the econometric
technique.  The GMM-System estimator that we use provides efficient estimates for
empirical growth models, while standard estimators used in previous studies are
35  The two estimates  lead, however,  to very different results regarding the set control variables:  the
initial income per capita variable becomes  insignificant when the within estimator is uses, suggesting that
the fixed individual effects capture the convergence  effect.  Similarly, the share of non-state production is
insignificant.  Overall, this suggests that these variables may not vary enough to remain  significant in the
presence of fixed provincial effects.
20inefficient for panel autoregressive  models. Moreover,  GMM-system estimators also
outperform the first generation GMM-estimators  when the time-series  is persistent as is
typically the case in economic growth models.
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24Appendix:  definition of the variables and statistical sources
Variable definition
*  GDP per capita:  logarithm of real GDP per capita.
*  Investment rate:  ratio of fixed investment to GDP.
*  Schooling:  share of population with more than secondary schooling.
*  Non-state production:  Share of non-state gross industrial output value  in total gross industrial output
value.
*  Fdi: ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP.
*  SIZE:  ratio of total deposits of the banking  system to GDP.
*  SOB:  ratio of total  state-owned bank credit to GDP.
*  CENTRAL:  ratio of loans to deposits of the state-owned  banks.
*  CONCENTRATION:  Herfindqahl  index of banking deposit concentration  (H,,t).
H,.,t=  E  iSL  Si,,,,,
Where  Sj,,,t isthe sum of deposits for bankj, i the province,  t the period, and n the number of banks.
List of provinces  and municipalities
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Nei Mongolia,  Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang,  Shanghai, Jiangsu,
Zhejiang,  Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong,  Henan, Hubei,  Hunan, Guangdong,  Guangxi, Hainan,
Guizhou, Yunnan,  Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang,  Sichuan+Chongqing.
Statistical sources
*  State Statistical Bureau, various years, Almanac of China Foreign  Relations and Trade, China
Economics  Publishing House.
*  Research  and Statistics Department of the People's Bank of China, various years, Almanac of China
Finance and Banking, Chinese version,  People's China Publishing House, Beijing.
*  State Statistical Bureau,  various years, China Statistical  Yearbook,  China Statistical  Bureau,  Beijing.
*  State Statistical Bureau,  1996, China Regional  Economy, a profile of 17 years of reform and opening-
up, China Statistical Bureau, Beijing,
*  Al l China Marketing  Research, 2001,  1949-1999  China Statistical Data Compilation,  China
Statistical Bureau, Beijing.Malta
Switzerland



































Pakistan  Gn  0
Arentia 
Iran,  Islairic Rep.  a
@  l  - |  |  ~~~~~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~Sri  Lanka 
Paraguay  m0'
V=4~~~~~~~~~~  Peru, 
Mexa ic  0
~~~,  . , ~~~~~~~~~~:  |  ~~~~~Haiti  Q  v
C  mGarbia,The
v3  r  ,  - W  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ~  ~~Papua  New Guinea  0o 
Argentina
T_'  I  l'  ' ~~~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~Lesotho  |'
a  &  ;  l  ~~~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~Ecuador  8  U;
T=-,  I,  '  ~~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~Mexico  00t_c 
~~~>  l  ,,  l  ~~~~~~~~~~~Colombia o  o~
im,  ',  '  ~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~Togo  i  _  2
. '  l  '  ~~~~~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~Senega,'l  cB 
Guatemala  co
Zimbabwe
b  t  '  ~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~Ghana  c 
^  r  t  Venezuela  . c
.,  X  '  Central African Republic  .
LZZ)  Sierra Leone
:j  Cameroon  c
Congo, Rep.  0  c  .2
Rwanda
.0  W  ]Malawi
-￿  Sudan
- - - C-  |  Niger
cr  i.o  .e  c1  c  o  cc  s  .!  s  lu
;_  - - - - - 0  0  o  0  o0c - - - ,  X  Malta
- __  Switzerland
- =  =  i  Japan
*  -- -!  ____  ~~~Italy
*  - - ~~~~~~Portugalo
- - _  t_s  Spain
- - -=  .France r
- z_  _  Austria  >
- =N=  Cyetherlands
*  - ~~~~Dominica
*  - - =  Germanv
Al&eria'
-_  ___  United States
South Africa
- - ~~~~Ireland
- - =  ~~Sweden
- ~~~~~Guyana  EZ
- '  Egypt, Arab Rep.
- - iii  Norwa  R





Syrian Arab Republic  y
Pakistan  S
Costa Rica  "
_..Denmark 







o _  Togo  0
Papua New Guinea
Trinidad and Tobago  E
.-  Kenya  ,.-





cis  =s-  ~~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~Mexico  ,
ts  esD  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Nicaragua  C a
oo  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ~~~New Zealand 
El Salvador  o
Haiti 
Senegal
|  - Sudan w-
Zimbabwe  o  .2
C2  G  _  Argentina
Phl  ippines  . , Ecuaaor
o  z  _  Honduras
Paraguay  8  - ,
Israei  l
Chile
Guatemala  .r  ^




Sierra Leone  c
Peru
Malawi  r  .2
Central African Republic  a
:  ra=  ~~~~~~~~~~~Congo,Rep.  c
Colombia  0  .
Indonesia  8 
..  r  ~~~~~~~~~~Brazil  .-  8  Ei
.0  ii  Rwanda  .
|  i  Niger
- - c  Congo, Dem. Rep.  c  $ -






0.4  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0.2  - - - - - 3
0.0  l  i  l  l
-.  -.  . _  2  =  =  =  g 
_.  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~C  r  oQ
~~~  _  2  ~~~~~~."  2  2s  C
Commrcia-Cetralisclcua.e  as th  Mai  of asset  of deoi  mone  bank  (line  22-d  toGP(in9)
ID  "  _.~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~  ~N.
CD ~~~~~~0  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The  sample is composed of China and the 78 countries of the World Bank dataset of financial  development indicators  (see Beck, Demirgiig-Kunt,  and Levine 2000).
Commercial-Central  is calculated as the ratio of assets of deposit money banks (lines 22a-d) to GDP (line 99b).


























Indonesia  o  o
Peru
__  5  Spain  ._ <,,~§~pa
. __  __  C~~~~~yprus  ].
Sweden
Congo, Rep.  2 
Greece
Thailand  0
Israel  6  °
Italy  >  'a
Algeria  'o  <
_  E  _  _  _  Lesotho  i 
00  s  _ _=Rwanda
Zimbabwe  A  O
_n  . . .,,^.  _  _  _Philippines  a  4
x0  z  _ _"Paraguay
cri  I  _  _  _  _  Costa Rica  001
U  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Niger ZS
U  _  _  Honduras  f  ),




_  E  _  _  Pakistan
Brazil
Dominica
. _  _  _  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~Colombia  o
es  E  _lD  _India
El Salvador
Gambia, The  0  I
X  ES  . - ................  Togo
_  s  _  Mauritius  ................  Muitu
Argentina  ..
Uruguay  o  L3
Central African  Republic  0x
Ecuador  r
_  _  --  .-  Sri Lanka
Mexico  U
Guatemala
eU  ==-_  _;  Chile  Ce.
Q  _  _  __  ~~~~~~~~~~~~Malawi  ........ 
- _  __  Jamaica  ce
Nepal  Arab  Rep.  U
Egypt, Arab Rep.  o  .
X  _  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Sudan ........ 
a  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Guyana  .........  n 
Haiti
Ghana
Nicaragua  0  ,
Sierra Leone  .O
Syrian Arab Republic  E
_____  _Bolivia  c
00  0  oE











0 .2-  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0.0  ----------  ~  ~
0  -~  ~~q  .0  . L-
_  A B ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~i  r  -o.3BEo  >  z  wD  - ZCC 
The  samnple  is composed of China and the  78 countries of the World Bank dataset  of financial  development  indicators (see Beck,  DemirgtlS-Kunt,  and Levine 2000).
Private Credit is calculated  as the ratio of credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector (lines 22d + 42d) to GDP (line 99b).
For China, Private credit is calculated using an estimate of the share of total credit directed to state enterprises of 90% in 1985  and 77.5% in 1999 (from Economic
Intelligence  Unit, February  18, 2002, "China:  Grossly Distorted Product.").
Source: International Financial  Statistics,  IMF.






0.  - n¢  -tnrz  -3 - -. r2  -no  <  z  - - - - -- ----  - - - ---- c  - - - - ---  -tz
0.1  ~  ~  ~  ~  N  t  iZi-'-  -uD1
=r E  CD  =,.0  CDm  C  yd~-  CD  D  - --.  D  . 0  0 ~~  -~~~~  CD  ~~~~~  n  o  CD  CD  -
ForC  China,  Pia  c  i  car  CD  t  t  e  o.  i  1999.
PI  r-  9  , ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DCD  >o
*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  0
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)0
T'he sample is composed of China and the 78  countries  of the World Bank dataset of financial development indicators  (see Beck, Demirgii~-Kunt,  and Levine 2000).
Private Credit is calculated  as the ratio of credit by deposit money banks and other financial  institutions to the private sector (lines 22d + 42d) to GDP (line 99b)
For China, Private credit is calculated using an estimate  of the share of total credit directed to state enterprises  of 90% in  1985  and 77.5% in 1999.
Source: International  Financial Statistics,  IMF.
31IFigure 4: Provinciae  Investment and Saving Rates
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Investment rate: share of gross capital formation in GDP
Saving rate: ratio of GDP minus total consumption to GDP.
Source: Al I China Marketing Research, 2001,  1949-1999 China  Statistical  Data  Compilation,  China Statistical
Bureau, Beijing. China Statistical Yearbook,  2001,  China Statistical Bureau,  Beijing.Figure 5.1a:  Size and Real Growth of per Capita GDP (1990-1994, average  values)
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Source: China Statistical  Yearbook, Almanac of China Finance  and Banking (various issues).
33Figure 5.2a: Size aImdl  Real Growth of per Capita GD1P (l995-1999,  average valRes)
Full  Sample
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, Almanac of China Finance and Banking (various issues).
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook,  Almanac of China Finance and Banking (various issues).






_  ~~~~~~~~~G  a n  Ms ngJ  I  a  n g
Jlin  LLiaoning
















f uizhou  HellongJ
Guangxi  Sicihuan  Jiangsu
H,n,rflJiangxi
Nei  Mong  Shandong Hubeil  n? 
.636271  - Hunan  Anhui
6.36362  7.90601
gdpcapO
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, Almanac of China Finance  and Banking (various issues).
36Figure 6a: Sob and Real Growth of per Capita GDP
(full sample, 1990-1999,  average values)
Full Sample
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, Almanac of China Finance and Banking (various  issues).
37lFigure 6b: Sob and Ilnitial Level of Capita  GDD1P
(restricted  sample, 1990-1999, average values)
Full Sample
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38Figure 7a: Central and Real Growth of per Capita GDP
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Source: China Statistical  Yearbook, Almanac of China Finance and Banking (various issues).
39Figure 7b: Central  and linitial Level of Capits G1DP
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, Almanac of China Finance and Banking (various  issues).
40Figure 8a: Concentration  and Real Growth of per Capita GDP
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, Almanac of China Finance and Banking (various  issues).
41lFigure $b:  Concentration  and  lRnitial  Level of Capita GDP
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Source: China Statistical  Yearbook, Almanac  of China Finance  and Banking  (various issues).
42Figure 9.1: Size and Non-State Production
(1990-1994,  average values)
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Figure 9.2: SIZE and Non-State Production
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Source: China Statistical  Yearbook, Almanac  of China Finance and Banking (various issues).
43Figure 10: Sob and Non-State Production (1990-1999, average values)
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Source: China Statistical  Yearbook,  Almanac of China Finance and Banking (various issues).
44Figure 12: Concentration and Non-State Production  (1990-1999, average values)
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45T'able la: Feldstein-Horioka  Test for Capital Mobility
(Within)
Explanatory variables:
Saving rate  r2  #provinces  # obs
Dependent variables:
(l.a) Investment  rate  0.532
(0.059)***  0.79  25  400
(2.a) Investment  rate - central budget financing  0.518
(0.065)F**  0.78  25  362





Saving rate  consumption  r2  #p rovinces  # obs
Dependent variables:
(l.b) investment rate  1.371  0.03  25  400
(0.565)**
(2.b) Investment rate - central budget financing  1.340  0.12  25  362
(0.601)**
(3.b) Saving rate *  -0.218  0.84  25  400
(0.094)**
All the regressions  include  individual and time fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are in  parentheses,  ¢ (t)  (t¢)  indicate significance  at the 10  (5) (1)  percent levels
* Instrumental regression.
*  The r2 levels are lower in the 2SLS regressions  because they account only for the explanatory variables.
In the OLS regressions, the r2 account for both the explanatory  variables and the time fixed effects.
Period:  1985-2000, 26 provinces. The three municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai are excluded.
Due to data non-availability,  Tibet is excluded from the sample.
46Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics  - Average  Values  (1990-99)
GDP per capita  Non-state
Growth rate  Initial (log)  SIZE  SOB  CENTRAL  CONCENTRATION  Investmentrate  Schooling  Fdi  production
Beijing  9%  7.93  274%  98%  0.53  0.29  50%  69%  6%  43%
Tianjin  10%  7.73  117%  104%  1.29  0.22  40%  55%  9%  62%
Hebei  12%  6.67  96%  58%  0.95  0.20  31%  43%  2%  64%
Shanxi  8%  6.66  129%*  79%  1.03  0.18  29%  47%  1%  53%
Nei Mongolia  8%  6.71  71%  74%  1.35  0.24  29%  43%  0%  38%
Liaoning  9%  7.31  99%  61%  1.25  0.25  29%  53%  4%  53%
Jilin  9%  6.84  92%  91%  1.69  0.24  28%  51%  2%  35%
Heilongjiang  7%  6.99  81%  65%  1.26  0.23  25%  50%  1%  33%
Shanghai  11%  8.48  145%  89%  1.03  0.23  48%  66%  7%  52%
Jiangsu  13%  7.16  83%*  42%  0.96  0.18  32%  44%  5%  76%
Zhejiang  14%  7.01  83%  41%  0.89  0.20  36%  40%  2%  81%
Anhui  11%  6.37  60%  52%  1.27  0.19  24%  34%  1%  60%
Fujian  14%  6.71  74%*  42%  0.90  0.19  28%  31%  11%  78%
Jiangxi  10%  6.46  81%*  68%  1.28  0.19  22%  35%  1%  50%
Shandong  13%  6.72  71%  43%  1.07  0.19  27%  39%  3%  67%
Henan  10%  6.38  75%  54%  1.09  0.19  27%  44%  1%  61%
Hubei  10%  6.71  74%*  59%  1.42  0.19  27%  41%  2%  54%
Hunan  9%  6.38  60%  52%  1.23  0.21  23%  40%  2%  55%
Guangdong  12%  7.08  155%*  59%  0.86  0.23  37%  39%  12%  75%
Guangxi  11%  6.02  83%*  53%  0.97  0.19  25%  34%  3%  50%
Hainan  11%  6.68  171%*  98%  0.98  0.19  47%  41%  14%  45%
Guizhou  7%  6.02  78%  68%  1.25  0.22  25%  23%  0%  32%
Yunnan  8%  6.34  1t0%*  59%  0.91  0.20  30%  23%  0%  33%
Shaanxi  8%  6.53  115%  78%  1.20  0.22  31%  42%  2%  39%
Gansu  8%  6.61  106%  83%  1.06  0.23  29%  32%  1%  34%
Qinghai  6%  6.60  98%*  107%  1.41  0.24  39%  27%  0%*  22%
Ningxia  7%  6.69  111%  103%  1.21  0.22  40%  38%  0%  31%
Xinjiang  8%  6.76  103%  75%  0.94  0.23  42%  37%  0%*  26%
Sichuan+Chongging**  9%  6.41  76%  51%  1.25  0.21  27%  34%  1%  52%
* averaged over 1995-1999
**Chongqing  city was given a municipality status in 1997,  and was before this date part of Sichuan province.  The statistics of Sichuan province and
Chongqing city were therefore aggregated  from 1997 onwards.
Due to data unavailability,  Tibet is excluded from the sample.
Source: see data description  in appendix.Table 21b:  ]Descriptive Statistics: Correlations




co  o  _  S  _  DS  - o
Investment rate  0.94  0.85  0.96
Control Variables  Schooling  0.64  0.81
Non-state production  0.93
SOB  0.33  0.96  0.95  -0.76  -0.50  -0.92  -0.91
Banking  SIZE  0.04  0.03  0.32  0.59  -0.16  0.04
Indicators  Central  0.99  -0.91  -0.72  -0.93  -0.98
CONCENTRATION  -0.92  -0.74  -0.96  -0.99Table 3a: Financial Intermediation and Economic  Growth: Augmented  Solow  Model
(GMM-System)
la  2a  3a  4a  5a
Initial GDP per capita  1.059  ***  0.950  ***  0.979  ***  1.008  **  1.015  ***
0.038  0.029  0.043  0.078  0.053
Investment rate  0.208  0.317  0.132  0.373  0.393
0.164  0.170  0.206  0.242  0.335
Schooling  0.343  0.235  0.344  0.030  0.130
0.457  0.186  0.220  0.522  0.427
SIZE  -0.148  **-0.044
0.033  0.053
SOB  -0.207  ***
0.045
CENTRAL  -0.243  ***
0.075
CONCENTRATION  -2.151  ***  -1.625  ***
0.653  0.529
Sargan Test  21.580  22.030  17.740  19.490  19.260
AR(2) Test  -1.046  -1.248  -0.966  -1.401  -1.199
Observations  98  104  104  101  98
Provinces  26  26  26  26  26
Beta-convergence  rate*:  ns  2.6%  *  ns  ns  ns
ns: non  significant.
The regressions are panel regressions,  which include time, fixed effects, with  data averaged over 2-year period  from  1990-
1999, and using lagged differences  and level values as instruments,  as described in  the text.
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals.  The null hypothesis of the
serial correlation test is  that the errors in  the first-difference  regression  exhibit no second-order serial correlation.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses,  * (**) (***)  indicate  significance at the  10 (5) (1) percent levels.
*Beta convergence significance  is assessed by testing whether the coefficient of the initial GDP per capita is  significantly
smaller than unity. The convergence rate is calculated by applying the following formula:  -ln(oco)/T,  where T=2 is the time
spell and ao is the coefficient of the initial GDP per capita.
49Table 3b: Financial lIntermediation  and Economic Growth:  Controlling for the State Sector
(GMM-System)
lb  2b  3b  4b  5b
Initial GDP per capita  0.976  *  0.907  ***  0.908  *  0.930  *c*  0.935  *
0.039  0.035  0.029  0.046  0.045
Investmentrate  0.172  0.208  0.148  0.354  *'*  0.231  *'*
0.180  0.158  0.216  0.136  0.199
Schooling  -0.025  0.312  0.552  t  0.191  0.269
0.323  0.206  0.230  0.395  0.445
Non-state production  0.237  *  0.226  *  0.208  0.198  ***  0.209  *
0.078  0.086  0.077  0.096  0.069




CENTRAL  -0.150  ' 
0.046
CONCENTRATION  -1.479  **  -1.213  *
0.702  0.462
Sargan Test  20.130  20.360  17.830  17.120  17.400
AR(2) Test  -1.020  -1.245  -1.218  -1.262  -1.180
Observations  98  104  104  101  98
Provinces  26  26  26  26  26
Beta-convergence  rate:  ns  4.9%  '*  4.8%  ns  ns
ns: non significant.
The regressions are panel regressions,  which include time, fixed effects,  with data averaged  over 2-year period from  1990-
1999, and using lagged differences and level values as instruments,  as described  in  the text.
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. The null hypothesis of the
serial correlation test is that the errors in  the first-difference  regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses,  * (**)  (e**)  indicate significance at the  10 (5) (1)  percent levels.
*Beta convergence  significance is assessed by testing whether the coefficient of the initial GDP per capita is  significantly
smaller than unity. The convergence rate is calculated by applying the following formula: -ln(ao)/T,  where T=2 is  the time
spell and ao is  the coefficient of the initial GDP per capita.
50Table 3c: Financial Intermediation and Economic  Growth: Controlling for Foreign Direct
Investment
(GMM-System)
Ic  2c  3c  4c  5c
Initial GDP per capita  0.984  ***  0.903  ***  0.929  ***  0.906  ***  0.970  ***
0.036  0.039  0.052  0.058  0.050
Investment rate  0.431  *  0.377  *  0.269  0.242  0.320
0.243  0.176  0.210  0.163  0.233
Schooling  -0.013  0.279  0.575  *  0.126  0.057
0.202  0.253  0.307  0.385  0.329
Non-state production  0.368  ***  0.154  ***  0.219  ***  0.227  ***  0.280  ***
0.067  0.073  0.076  0.071  0.076
Foreign direct investment  -0.833  -0.069  -0.314  0.193  -0.628
0.426  0.378  0.437  0.456  0.640
SIZE  0.046  0.093
0.057  0.064
SOB  -0.197  **
0.092
CENTRAL  -0.182  **
0.071
CONCENTRATION  -0.926  -1.356  **
0.619  0.666
Sargan Test  19.780  19.490  17.020  16.480  15.960
AR(2) Test  -1.304  -1.265  -1.207  -1.198  -1.289
Observations  96  102  102  99  96
Provinces  26  26  26  26  26
Beta-convergence  rate:  ns  5.1%  ns  4.9%  ns
ns: non significant.
The regressions  are panel regressions, which  include time, fixed effects,  with data averaged  over 2-year period from  1990-
1999, and using lagged differences and level  values as instruments,  as described in the text.
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals.  The null hypothesis of the
serial correlation test is that the errors in the first-difference  regression  exhibit no second-order serial correlation.
Robust standard errors are in  parentheses,  * (**)  (***) indicate significance at the 10 (5) (1) percent levels.
*Beta convergence  significance  is  assessed by testing whether the coefficient of the initial GDP per capita is significantly
smaller than unity. The convergence rate is calculated by applying the following formula: -ln(a 0)/T, where  T=2 is  the time
spell and cN  is the coefficient of the initial GDP per capita.
51Tsable 4a: IFksmcial  Thmntermnedisadoin  and EconomAe GgrowtDn: ARtenmadve Estnmatows (DiDf-GMM  nmd Watlhi)
Diff  Diff  Diff  Diff  Diff  within  within  within  within  within
1  2  3  4  5  1'  2'  3'  4'  5'
InitialGDPpercapita  0.521  ***  0.538***  0.597*o*  0.563***  0.527***  0.536o**  0.523t**  0.582***  0.5564**  0.570***
0.092  0.071  0.067  0.086  0.076  0.074  0.081  0.064  0.082  0.064
Investnent rate  0.251  0.243  0.204  0.260  0.193  0.310**  0.361t*  0.279*t  0.283"t  0.295""'
0.226  0.174  0.099  0.190  0.153  0.132  0.095  0.054  0.091  0.093
Schooling  0.288  -0.039  0.077  0.096  0.225  0.383  0.183  0.283  0.222  0.211
0.467  0.409  0.335  0.441  0.344  0.443  0.303  0.249  0.350  0.349
Non-state production  -0.018  -0.043  0.016  -0.005  0.013  -0.040  -0.050  -0.024  -0.029  -0.032
0.095  0.098  0.088  0.120  0.086  0.105  0.098  0.087  0.109  0.097
SIZE  -0.056  -0.060  0.043  0.039
0.072  0.057  0.083  0.071
SOB  -0.152**  -0.198 t
0.062  0.065
CENTRAL  -0.133 t  -0.165 "t4
0.004  0.047
CONCENTRATION  -0.565  -0.480  -0.738 **  -0.823 *
0.349  0.309  0.319  0.379
Sargan Test  21.000  19.000  20.300  20.540  19.630
AR(2) Test  -1.494  -1.684  -1.516  -1.528  -1.448
Observations  98  104  104  101  98  98  104  104  101  98
Provinces  26  26  26  26  26  26  26  26  26  26
R2  0.98  0.98  0.99  0.99  0.98
Beta-convergence  rate:  33%  t  31%**  26%***  29%***  32%***  31%***  32%t**  27%***  29%***  28%***
The regressions  are panel regressions, which include time fixed effects., with data averaged over 2-year period from 1990-1999
Robust standard errors are in parentheses,  * (**)  (***)  indicate significance at the 10 (5)  (1) percent levels
*Beta convergence  is  assessed by testing whether the coefficient of the initial GDP per capita is significantly smaller than unity. The convergence rate is calculated by
applying the following formula:  -ln(cO)/T, where T=2 is the time spell and aO  is the coefficient of  the initial GDP per capita.Table 4b: Financial Intermediation and Economic  Growth: Alternative Estimators
(OLS-Level)
I  2"  31"  4"  5"t
Initial GDP per capita  0.963 *  0.952 ***  0.959 ***  0.988  ***  0.989
0.019  0.019  0.019  0.014  0.015
Investment  rate  0.224***  0.294***  0.134***  0.169***  0.190***
0063  0.100  0.047  0.048  0.059
Schooling  0.099  0.102  0.105  0.062  0.083
0.081  0.092  0.105  0.075  0.072
Non-state  production  0.260 ***  0.204 ***  0.236 ***  0.196  ***  0.186 ***
0.027  0.043  0.036  0.032  0.034
SIZE  -0.022  -0.014
0.016  0.011
SOB  -0.094 ***
0.047
CENTRAL  -0.056 ***
0.045
CONCENTRATION  -0.822 ***  -0.830 ***
0.223  0.242
Observations  98  104  104  101  98
Provinces  26  26  26  26  26
R2  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99
Beta-convergence  rate:  1.9%  2.5%  2.1%  ns  ns
The regressions are panel regressions, which include time fixed effects.,  with data averaged over 2-year period from 1990-
1999
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, * (**) (***) indicate significance  at the  10 (5) (1)  percent levels.
ns: non significant
*Beta  convergence is assessed  by testing whether the coefficient of the initial GDP per capita  is significantly smaller than
unity. The convergence rate  is calculated by applying the following formula:  -ln(aO)/T,  where T=2  is the time spell and aO is
the coefficient of the initial GDP per capita.TablRe 5a: IFinancizl  llnteirmediation  and Economic Growth:  Without ]Investment
1  2  3  4  5
Initial GDP per capita  0.985 **  0.967*  0.937  0.977  **  0.921
0.0411  0.033  0.033  0026  0.052
Schooling  -0.045  0.154  0.446 *  -0.098  -0.132
0243  0.127  0.210  0.185  0.476
Non-state  production  0.244**  0.244***  0. 1  80***  0.175  0.215
0.095  0.093  0.046  0.079  0.104




CENTRAL  -0.146 4*
0.051
CONCENTRATION  -1.045  -1.529
0.382  0.579
Sargan Test  22.450  21.720  19.060  21.300  21.450
AR(2) Test  -1.168  -1.320  -1.146  -1.131  -1.140
Observations  98  104  104  101  98
Provinces  26  26  26  26  26
R2  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99
beta-convergence  rate:  -1.7%
t(10%,5%,  1%)= 1.66 (2.275, 2.625)  -0.365  -1.000  *  -1.909  -0.885  -1.519
Initial GDP per capita < 1  -0.015  -0.033  -0.063  -0.023  -0.079
ns: non significant.
The regressions are panel regressions,  which include time  fixed effects., with data averaged  over 2-year period from  1990-
1999
Robust standard errors are in  parentheses,  ° (¢)  (8"t) indicate significance at the  10 (5) (1) percent levels.
54Table 5b: Financial Intermediation and Economic  Growth: With Coastal Dummy
1  2  3  4  5
Initial GDP per capita  0.887***  0.800***  0.876***  0.896  0.914
0.079  0.077  0 086  0.077  0.070
Investment rate  0.237  0.261  **  0.130  0.290  0.251
0.207  0.115  0.057  0 229  0234
Schooling  0.354  0.434  0.483  0.091  0.265
0.081  0.298  0.353  0.291  0.399
Non-state production  0.217***  0.176  0.226***  0.199**  0.197
0.081  0.118  0.067  0.078  0.081




CENTRAL  -0.140 **
0.057
CONCENTRATION  -0.858*  -1.074
0.506  0538
Coastal dummy  0.030  0.078  0.009  0.042  0.013
0.053  0057  0 057  0.063  0.061
SarganTest  20.320  16.540  21.350  19.240  18.760
AR(2) Test  -1.222  -1.181  -1.197  -1.097  -1.185
Observations  98  104  104  101  98
Provinces  26  26  26  26  26
R2  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99
beta-convergence  rate:  -11.2%  *
t (10%,5%, 1%) =  1.66 (2.275, 2.625)  -1.430  -2.597  -1.442  -1.351  -1.229
Initial  GDP per capita < 1  -0.113  -0.200  -0.124  -0.104  -0.086
ns: non significant.
The regressions are panel regressions,  which  include time fixed effects., with  data averaged over 2-year period from 1990-
1999
Robust standard errors are in parentheses,  * (**) (***)  indicate significance  at the  10 (5) (1) percent levels.
55Table 6: IFinancial Iitermedi  aion and Ecoiomnic Growth:  Two 5-years Periods
within  within  within  within  within  gis  gis  gis  gis  gis
la  2a  3a  4a  5a  lb  2b  3b  5b  6b
Initial  GDP per capita  -0.034  0.147  0.245 **  0.228  0.001  0.922 **  0.922 *** 0.894 **  1.056  ***  1.070
0.114  0.094  0.098  0.140  0.154  0.073  0.064  0.059  0.054  0.062
-r.7109  . t.241  t.14%  -. M  t.A%  Z.M9  %.3S  - O\%  A.M
1.030  0.948  0.811  1.045  0.220  0.302  0.270  0.263  0.199  0.224
Non-state production  -0.543  -0.224  -0.227  -0.206  -0.528  0.484***  0.515***  0 444**  0.299*  0 191
0.329  0.273  0.260  0.325  0.344  0.128  0.151  0.107  0.105  0.122
Time fixed effect  0.670**  0.337  0.253  0.324**  0.633  -0.075  -0.091 ***  -0.015***  -0.170***  4.4173
0.116  0.071  0.080  0.095  0.158  0.039  0.034  0.037  0 034  0.041
SIZE  40.634**  40.587**  0.018  -0.006
0.203  0.249  0.078  0.057
SOB  -0.325  -0.061
0.142  0.119
CENTRAL  -0.254  -0.226
0.090  0.075
CONCENTRATION  -1.036  -0.414  -2.305  -2.660
0.941  1.173  0.706  0.767
Observations  43  52  52  50  43  43  52  52  50  43
Provinces  26  26  26  26  26  26  26  26  26  26
R2  0.00  0.46  0.55  0.46  0.00  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.97  0.97
ns: non significant.
The regressions are panel regressions, which include time fixed effects.,  with data averaged over 5-year period between  1990 and 1999
Robust standard errors are in parentheses,  * (**)  (***)  indicate significance  at the 10  (5) (1)  percent levels.Policy Research  Working  Paper Series
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